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BRIEFLY NOTED
All the Free Speech That Money Can Buy:
Monopolization of Issue Perception in
Referendum Campaigns
Political "free speech" is a costly item, and waging a political
campaign depends on the ability to obtain financial contributions.
Let's Help Florida, a committee organized to urge the passage of a
constitutional amendment to legalize casino gambling in southern
Florida, encountered a statutory obstacle to its fund-raising efforts;
the Florida campaign financing law set a $3,000 ceiling for contri-
butions to a committee "in support of, or in opposition to, an issue
to be voted on in a statewide election."1 Dade Voters for a Free
Choice, a committee organized to oppose the passage of a county
ordinance that would prohibit smoking in public places, similarly
wanted to receive larger contributions than the statutory $1,000
ceiling for countywide elections.2 Each committee sought relief in
federal district court, challenging the provisions of the statute
under the first and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution. The defendants, officials responsible for enforcement
of the provisions of the campaign financing statute,' contended
that the state's overriding interest in preserving the integrity of
the election process justified the contribution ceiling.5 The court
rejected this argument and struck down the statute as unconstitu-
tional. On appeal of these consolidated cases, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals held, affirmed: The Florida statute restricting the
size of financial contributions in referendum elections abridges
first amendment rights and cannot be justified by the state's inter-
1. FLA. STAT. § 106.08(I)(d) (1979).
2. Id. § 106.08(1)(e).
3. Let's Help Florida v. Smathers, 453 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Fla. 1978), afl'd, 621 F.2d
195 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1981). In March, 1979, the district court
relied upon its earlier decision in the Let's Help Florida case to strike down the statute
challenged by Dade Voters for a Free Choice. Dade Voters for a Free Choice v. Firestone,
No. 79-0770 (Mar. 13, 1979).
4. Defendants were the Secretary of State of Florida, the Director of the Division of
Elections, the Attorney General, and the individual members of the Florida Elections Com-
mission. See FLA. STAT. §§ 106.22-27 (1979).
5. 453 F. Supp. at 1012.
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est in preventing corruption or promoting disclosure. Let's Help
Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980).'
In Let's Help Florida, the court faced issues presented by the
impact of campaign funding and politics on the first amendment
guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of political associa-
tion. The primary first amendment problem raised by Florida's
limitations on campaign contributions was the restriction of the
contributors' freedom of political association. The Supreme Court
of the United States set the parameters of permissible government
interference with this protected right in Buckley v. Valeo.8 A state
may limit political contributions only if it "demonstrates a suffi-
ciently important interest and employs means closely drawn to
avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms."9 In Let's
Help Florida, the Fifth Circuit's decision turned on the state's fail-
ure to show a sufficiently important or compelling interest to jus-
tify restricting campaign contributions in referendum elections.
This note will analyze how the rationale of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Buckley v. Valeo, which upheld governmental
restrictions on political contributions to candidates, and First Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,10 which invalidated state restric-
tions on corporate expenditures and contributions in referendum
elections, inevitably led the Fifth Circuit to the result in Let's
Help Florida. The author will also consider whether the rationale
justifying the restriction on the rights of association and free
speech that the Supreme Court found persuasive in Buckley
should extend to the referendum context.
In Buckley, the Court held that the federal government's in-
terest in minimizing "the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions"1 was a
constitutionally sufficient justification for the limitations imposed
6. The court rejected the contention that the district court lacked jurisdiction because
no case or controversy existed between the parties. 621 F.2d at 198 (citing Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (1979)). The court also found that the principles of
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), did not preclude jurisdiction when no state proceed-
ing was pending at the time plaintiffs filed suit. Finally, the court rejected the state's claim
that the injunctive relief granted was inappropriate, reasoning that no legal remedy could
correct the irreparable injury to the plaintiff's first amendment rights when an election was
so imminent. 621 F.2d at 199.
7. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15, 24-25 (1976).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 25.
10. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
11. 424 U.S. at 26.
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by the Federal Election Campaign Act" on individual and group
campaign contributions to candidates or to campaign committees. 8
In Bellotti, the Court invalidated a Massachusetts statute" that
absolutely prohibited corporate contributions or expenditures to
support or oppose referendum questions not materially affecting
the corporation's assets. Because the statute totally banned corpo-
rate political speech, the Court held that it was an unconstitutional
restriction. Distinguishing between referendum and candidate elec-
tions, the Bellotti Court precluded the application of the Buckley
rationale to referendum elections: "The risk of corruption per-
ceived in cases involving candidate elections. . . simply is not pre-
sent in a popular vote on a public issue."15
The coercive and corrupting influence of unrestricted contri-
butions to a candidate's campaign arises from the probability that
elected officials will give favored treatment to their large financial
supporters. Courts view the potential for this kind of influence on
an elected official's future decisions and actions as a threat to the
integrity of our system of representative government. 16 Courts do
not, however, equate the motivation of financial supporters of ref-
erendum committees with attempts to secure a political quid pro
quo, because in the referendum context, the voters themselves di-
rectly and independently decide the particular political issue on
one occasion. 17
The court in Let's Help Florida relied on the distinction be-
tween candidate and referendum elections to reject the state's ar-
gument that the statutory restrictions on political contributions
helped prevent corruption of the democratic process." Other
courts have stricken down state restrictions on contributions,
presuming that corrupt motivation does not play a substantial role
12. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3, as amended
by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1273
(codified in scattered sections of 2, 47 U.S.C. (1976)) (amended 1976 & 1980).
13. The Court also held, however, that this governmental interest did not justify the
Act's limitations on the size of independent expenditures. 424 U.S. at 39-51. The Court
noted that since persons make direct expenditures without prearrangement and coordina-
tion with the candidate or his agents, there is less risk that such an expenditure will be a
quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidates. Id. at 47.
14. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1977).
15. 435 U.S. at 790.
16. 621 F.2d at 199-200.
17. Id. at 200.
18. The court also rejected the state's contention that the limitations were necessary to
promote adequate disclosure of the identity of campaign financers, "because the statutes
[were] not closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." Id.
19801
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in attempts to influence votes in a referendum.19 In Schwartz v.
Romnes,'0 for example, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that "[b]y their very nature referenda ... do not lend themselves
to those corrupting influences."" This presumption about referen-
dum elections combines the principles of Buckley and Bellotti and
effectively closes off the inquiry into whether allowing unlimited
financial contributions to referendum committees undermines the
integrity of our system.'2
A close reading of Bellotti, however, indicates that the Su-
preme Court may be willing to give further consideration to the
potential ability of wealthy and powerful corporations to "drown
out other points of view."'8 The Court noted that if the record or
legislative findings supported the argument "that corporate advo-
cacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic processes,
thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment inter-
ests,"' 4 then such an argument would merit consideration. Al-
though this dictum does not invite courts to envision the conse-
quences of allowing unlimited individual contributions to
referendum committees, it does justify an inquiry in those in-
19. 621 F.2d at 200 (citing C & C Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th
Cir. 1978); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 99 Cal. App. 3d 736, 160 Cal.
Rptr. 448, 451-55 (1979).
20. 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974).
21. Id. at 851. The court noted:
Although large private companies have undoubtedly been tempted to "buy" the
election of political candidates in the expectation of receiving favors if their can-
didates should be elected, it is difficult to see how such motivation would play
any substantial role in an attempt to influence votes for or against a referendum.
Id. Contra, Sutherland, O'Neal, Fish & Currier, Argument Against the Initiative and Refer-
endum, in THE INMATVE AND REFERENDUM (1912):
If... as alleged, corporate and corrupt influences are now able to determine the
choice of representatives, who are elected by the direct vote of the people, is
there any reason to suppose that these same influences will be any less able, or
less likely, to determine the acceptance, or rejection, of legislative measures by
that same direct vote through the referendum?
Id. at 36.
22. See 424 U.S. at 26-27.
23. 435 U.S. at 789.
24. Id. See also S. KmLE, JR., PoLrcAL CAMPAIGNING, PROBLEMS IN CREATING AN IN-
FORMED ELECTORATE (1960). In a critique of campaign expenditure ceilings, the author
noted:
The danger-at least from the public's point of view-is not that some politi-
cians will talk too much, but that others will be able to say too little ....
Rather than adopting this view of campaign expenditures, legislators have been
prone to consider large-scale spending as an evil in itself, and therefore as some-
thing to be kept in check.
Id. at 40.
[Vol. 35:157
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stances in which real abuses have distorted the election process.
Judicial willingness to consider whether unlimited corporate fund-
ing of political activities aimed at shaping public perception of is-
sues destroys the public confidence in the democratic process and
the integrity of government could well lead to a broader interpre-
tation of the contribution process. Without the benefit of a pre-
sumption, this argument will demand a strong evidentiary
showing.
The state did not make such a showing in Let's Help Florida,
and the court refused to acknowledge the potentially corrupting
influence of large campaign contributions on the referendum pro-
cess, noting that "when people vote on a referendum proposal,
they directly decide the pertinent political issue for themselves."
This interpretation of the nature of the referendum process is con-
sistent with a first amendment theory that one who has the ability
to marshal sufficient financial resources may wage an unrestricted
campaign in the battle of ideas. Whether people can sift through
the outpouring of information directed at them and, as political
decisionmakers, make considered judgments based on that infor-
mation, is not the concern of courts in upholding the first amend-
ment. The Supreme Court recognizes the danger that people will
not be able to evaluate the information, to the extent that the
Court acknowledges that the framers of the first amendment con-
templated this danger.2 7 Accordingly, the potential to control issue
perception does not as clearly threaten our democratic ideals as
does corruption in office. In fact, the Supreme Court emphatically
rejected as "wholly foreign to the First Amendment"' 8 the notion
that "government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
25. In Buckley, evidence of specific abuses and "pernicious practices" supported judi-
cial recognition of the corrupting influence of large campaign contributions to candidates
and their campaign committees. 424 U.S. at 27 & n.28.
In Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, - Cal. 3d -, 614 P.2d 742, 167
Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980), the dissent criticized the majority for inadequately supporting its con-
clusion that large financial contributions to referendum campaigns corrupt the electoral
process.
The study of a Colorado ballot measure, or a 16-year-old analysis which con-
cludes that the California initiative and referendum process is "largely a tool of
interest groups". . . do [sic] not constitute the hard evidentiary support needed
to demonstrate a state's present and compelling interest in the suppression of
the multiple First Amendment rights of our California citizens.
Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 752, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 94 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original); see note 30 infra.
26. 621 F.2d at 200.
27. 435 U.S. at 792.
28. 424 U.S. at 49.
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society in order to enhance the relative voice of others.""' A prob-
lem with this first amendment doctrine, in light of the impact of
modern campaign financing, is that the policies implemented
through the referendum process may represent only the best that
money can buy.
The Fifth Circuit's narrow interpretation of the dynamics of
the referendum process did not acknowledge the risks of un-
restricted funding of campaigns.8 0 Just as the political quid pro
quo can threaten the independence of the elected decisionmaker,
so can the control of issue perception through monopoly or satura-
tion of the media potentially threaten the independence of the
voter decisionmaker. Furthermore, the court's focus on the act of
voting overlooked the role of wide public discussion of issues in the
functioning of the democratic process. The significance of that role
stems from the notion that "hearing what can be said about [a
subject] by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all
modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind,""
will lead to rational choice. The referendum process is highly sensi-
tive to and dependent on an informed citizenry,'2 and it is pre-
29. Id. at 48-49.
30. In Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, - Cal. 3d -, 614 P.2d 742,
167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980), the California Supreme Court upheld the validity of a municipal
ordinance limiting the amount of contributions to committees formed to support or oppose
initiative and referendum issues. The court found that the municipality had a compelling
interest in seeking "to reverse the trend toward loss of confidence in our political system
and apathy in elections by assuring the voters that their vote and their participation...
are significant." Id. at -, 614 P.2d at 747-48, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90. More specifically, the
court found corruption of the electoral process because "the domination of these processes
[referenda and initiatives] by large contributors leaves other citizens with a stilled voice in
the very domain of our electoral system set aside for accomplishing the popular will," Id. at
-, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88, and because "voters lose confidence in our govern-
mental system if they come to believe that only the power of money makes a difference." Id.
at -, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
31. J. S. MILL, ON LinRRTY 19 (Rapaport ed. 1978). See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE
SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO Smi-GovERNMZNT 26 (1948): "Just so far as... the citizens
who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or
disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-consid-
ered, ill-balanced planning for the general good."
32. For a discussion of the idealized perception of the referendum process espoused by
the Progressive movement in American politics, see D. BUTLER & A. RANNEY, REFzRENDUMS,
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 27-29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as RzmaN-
DUMS]. The Man of Good Will, John Q. Public, would not be a member of a pressure group
or organization to advance his own interests:
[H]e would dissociate himself from such combinations and address himself di-
rectly and high-mindedly to the problems of government .... [Hie would
study the issues . . . [and] it was assumed that somehow he would really be
capable of informing himself in ample detail about the many issues that he
[Vol. 35:157.
BRIEFLY NOTED
election activities that provide the information upon which the
voters will make their choice. Discussing freedom of political
thought and communication, Professor Meiklejohn stated:
In the specific language of the Constitution, the governing
activities of the people appear only in terms of casting a ballot.
But in the deeper meaning of the Constitution, voting is merely
the external expression of a wide and diverse number of activi-
ties by means of which citizens attempt to meet the responsibili-
ties of making judgments, which that freedom to govern lays
upon them. That freedom implies and requires what we call
"dignity of the individual." Self-government can exist only inso-
far as the voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity,
and generous devotion to the general welfare that, in theory,
casting a ballot is assumed to express. The citizens' understand-
ing, evaluating, and deciding of political issues are the activities
to whose freedom the first amendment gives unqualified
protection.8
The proliferation of information favoring one side of an issue,
which results not from the expression of many views in the com-
munity but from the one view supported by an interested and
wealthy portion of the community, distorts the classical free
speech model of the "marketplace of ideas. '8 4 Since messages
packaged and presented in the media generate most of the political
discussion, "what the media choose to print or televise has a very
great, perhaps too great, influence on how the choice is per-
ceived" 85 by the voters. And access to the media is readily reduci-
ble to money terms, when dollars contributed are the essence of
would have to pass on .... Without such assumptions the entire movement for
such reforms as the initiative, the referendum, and the recall is unintelligible.
Id. at 29 (quoting R. HOFSTADTER, AGE OF REFORM 261 (1955)). But see id. at 226 (noting as
a deficiency of referendums their tendency to force decisions by the electorate before the
decision process has fully worked itself out).
33. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. Rav. 245, 255. See
also BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the Substance
and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 308 (1978) (noting the importance of
Meiklejohn's work "in establishing that the integral relationship between freedom to engage
in discussion about government and freedom to participate as citizens in the process of
representative government is a legitimate initial premise of first amendment reasoning").
34. See Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. RRv.
964, 981-90 (1978), for a critique of the "market-failure model" of the scope of speech pro-
tected by the first amendment. The market-failure model asserts that factors such as mo-
nopoly control of the media and unequal access to the media prevent the "marketplace of
ideas" from operating successfully. Id. at 965-66.
35. REFERENDUMS, supra note 32, at 36.
1980]
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the speech activity."s If courts would recognize that the monopoli-
zation of public discussion through saturation of the "market-
place" can predetermine how the voter will cast his ballot, they
might acknowledge that such monopolization can jeopardize the
political process just as surely as does an elected official's "debt" to
his financial supporters that predetermines the outcome of the offi-
cial acts and decisions.8 7
In the progression of first amendment decisions, Let's Help
Florida rests solidly on the precedent of Buckley and Bellotti.
Without a showing that the voice of large moneyed interests has
"drown[ed] out other points of view, '" the first amendment will
continue to protect the indirect influence of large campaign contri-
butions on voter decisionmakers. The fear that a political commit-
tee with a large amount of contributed funds will "buy up" the
mass market of ideas, and thus buy the vote on a mass level
through issue saturation, still seems too attenuated, and the value
of first amendment freedom is too precious, for one to expect the
court to validate state-imposed restrictions on contributions in the
referendum context.
LONNIE LIPTON COLAN
Clash Between Due Process and the Right
to Trial by Jury in Complex Litigation
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.'
36. The Supreme Court decision in Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980), adds a new dimension to the threat posed by corporate expenditures
in furtherance of political causes to the ideal conception of a free marketplace of ideas. See
note 24 supra. Although the decision did not involve the electoral process, it demonstrates
that the Court apparently extends first amendment protection for the political messages of
monopolies as far as it does for the speech of any individual wishing to express political
views to an audience.
37. See generally Lee, California, in REFERNDUMS, supra note 32. In discussing refer-
endum campaigns and campaign expenditures, the author conceded that the success or fail-
ure of an initiative does not necessarily correspond to the amount of money expended, but
noted that disparities in funds can be decisive in a closely contested campaign. In particular,
a lengthy and complicated issue on which technical experts disagree, such as the safety of
nuclear power, puts a heavy burden on campaign publicity to educate the voter. Id. at 101-
07.
38. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 789 (1980).
1. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litigation).
[Vol. 35:164
